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Abstract 
The astounding capacity for the human imagination to be engaged across a wide 
range of contexts is limitless and fundamental to our day-to-day experiences. 
Although processes of imagination are central to human psychological function, they 
rarely occupy center stage in academic discourse or empirical study within 
psychological and neuroscientific realms. The aim of the paper is to tackle this 
imbalance by drawing together the multitudinous facets of imagination within a 
common framework. The processes fall into one of five categories depending on 
whether they are characterized as involving perceptual/motor related mental 
imagery, intentionality or recollective processing, novel combinatorial or generative 
processing, exceptional phenomenology in the aesthetic response, or altered 
psychological states which range from commonplace to dysfunctional. These 
proposed categories are defined on the basis of theoretical ideas from philosophy as 
well as empirical evidence from neuroscience. By synthesizing the findings across 
these domains of imagination, this novel five-part or quinquepartite classification of 
the human imagination aids in systematizing, and thereby abets, our understanding 
of the workings and brain basis of the human imagination. It would serve as a 
blueprint to direct further advances in the field of imagination while also promoting 
crosstalk with reference to stimulus-oriented facets of information processing. A 
biologically and ecologically valid psychology is one that seeks to explain 
fundamental aspects of human nature. Given the ubiquitous nature of the 
imaginative operations in our daily lives, there can be little doubt that these 
quintessential aspects of the mind should be central to the discussion. 
 
Keywords: imagination; brain networks; creativity; aesthetics; intentionality; imagery 
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“All human accomplishment has this same origin, identically. Imagination is a force of nature.”              
- Saul Bellow, Henderson the Rain King 
 
Ever since the inception of the approach, cognitive psychology (and subsequently 
cognitive neuroscience) has been dominated by the S-O-R model where the central 
idea is that stimuli within the environment are perceived by an organism who makes 
sense of this information and generates appropriate responses on the basis of the 
contingencies of the situation at hand and prior knowledge. Although the 
representational model in cognitive psychology is still the most influential in relating 
psychological function to brain function, the usefulness of this model is being 
increasingly questioned. Some call for an overhaul of its central assumptions while 
others seek to deemphasize or accentuate the focus of one or the other aspect of 
this neat cycle, which is typically instantiated in terms of information processing 
computations. The credo of predictive coding models (Clark, 2013; Grossberg, 
2009), for instance, is that thought and action systems are characterized by the drive 
to predict effectively and efficiently. Embodied cognition advocates stress the central 
role of the body and its interaction with the information-rich environment (Chemero, 
2009; Wilson and Golonka, 2013), whereas the evolution within different aspects of 
the system that unfold over time are central to dynamical systems models (Beer, 
2000; Gelfand and Engelhart, 2012). These are certainly exciting times to be a 
cognitive psychologist or neuroscientist, particularly if one’s principal focus is in the 
domains of perception and action.  
 
There is, however, a glaring omission from these discussions that seek to 
characterize the overarching principles of the mind. An almost exclusive focus on the 
cycle of stimulus-oriented thought and behavior has meant that the dynamics 
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underlying spontaneous, stimulus-independent and imaginative aspects of the mind, 
or indeed how they relate to the former, are largely overlooked (Christoff, 2012) or 
only discussed in a highly circumscribed manner. While such omissions are not due 
to any form of intentional snubbing but is a consequence of following the prevailing 
traditions and dogmas espoused within the discipline, the time has come to 
genuinely consider how our engagement in relatively tricky, sketchy and esoteric 
realms of imagination fit with dominant views of how the mind works. A biologically 
and ecologically valid psychology can only be one that seeks to explain fundamental 
aspects of human nature, and there can be little doubt that imaginative aspects of 
the mind should be central to the discussion.  
 
Why do we need to consider the imagination as a whole?  
A key criticism that is regularly leveled at experimental psychologists is the patent 
lack of ecological validity for most part; that laboratory-based contexts do not 
accurately reflect the complex contingencies within the real world of the 
phenomenon that is being assessed. One can take this point much further though. 
What proportion of actual everyday psychological experience is being tested in 
empirical work? Just take the case of the kind of responses that are recorded as 
data and analyzed to evaluate psychological function. In day-to-day activities, 
responses are rarely required with an immediacy of seconds, and are, more often 
than not, non-binary or qualitative. Response type and speed is also highly situation-
specific. For instance, when I receive a text message with the following instruction: 
“Call me when you get this!” my actions are not automatically prompted by the 
information within that sentence alone. How and when I choose to respond depends 
on a number of factors, such as who sent the message, my relationship with the 
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person, prior experience and resulting expectations, the physical context that I am in 
at the time, my current state of mind, and my personality disposition. The chosen 
outcome is informed by the dynamic and complex interplay between these factors.  
 
The situation is further complicated when considering the fact that our minds are 
constantly occupied even when no response is required, and that the content of our 
contemplations is not necessarily related to the information that is presently coming 
through our senses. This is empirically supported by investigations of spontaneous 
cognition using retrospective thought sampling questionnaires. Within rest periods 
during an experiment where participants passively fixate on a centrally presented 
cross and there is neither a task to attend nor a response to prepare, participants 
report thinking about the stimuli they just encountered only 10% of the time. Instead, 
their minds engage in free and active internal mentation of the past, the future, non-
temporal aspects of the world, and so on (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, and 
Buckner, 2010).  
 
One of the critical questions to address is the type and extent of the overlap between 
imaginative and non-imaginative aspects of perceptual, cognitive and behavioral 
function. How do neurocognitive models fare in explaining psychological function 
where the focus on S and R aspects of the S-O-R cycle is diminished? What are the 
keys to understanding the emergence of self-propagating aspects of O? How does 
the essentially receptive-predictive cycle of the brain give rise to open-ended 
imaginative thinking?   
 
The	Imaginative	Mind	
6	
	
Such questions may raise a more fundamental issue of whether the disciplines of 
psychology and neuroscience should concern themselves with “non-task specific” 
mental activities at all. And the answer would depend on the motivations of scientists 
in question. If the aim to understand the fundamental nature of human experience, 
then the answer would be in the affirmative, regardless of the substantial challenges 
involved in doing so. It is also worth noting that non-task specific mental activities – 
in terms of spontaneous thought, stimulus-independent thought, task-unrelated 
thought, daydreaming or mind wandering – are already discussed within the 
psychological and neuroscientific literature as reflecting operations of imagination 
(e.g., Christoff, 2012; Giambra, 1995; Mason et al., 2007; Zedelius and Schooler, 
2015). This is paralleled by rather wide notions in the philosophical tradition about 
the processes of imagination, where “to imagine something is to form a particular 
sort of mental representation of that thing” (Gendler, 2013).  
 
Indeed, much of the work on task-unrelated mental activities is discussed with 
explicit reference to imagination relevant processes, such as imagery (e.g., TUIT: 
task-unrelated imagery and thought in Giambra, 1995). Others have pointed out the 
spontaneous and inward-directed nature of task-unrelated mental activities such that 
they involve the “automatic activation of a personally relevant, but task-unrelated, 
goal has temporarily drawn our attention away from the primary task” (Smallwood 
and Schooler, 2006). Moreover, the fact that we now have abundant evidence to 
show that there is a substantial overlap between the neural networks and information 
processing mechanisms associated with such undirected or spontaneous facets of 
imagination and directed or deliberate facets of imagination (Schacter, 2012a; 
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Smallwood et al., 2011; Stawarczyk and D’Argembeau, 2015) is indicative of the 
necessity to consider both sides of imagination in relation to one another.   
 
The mere challenge of the enterprise should not be the reason to shy away from 
engaging with the topic of imagination head on. There are several examples of 
complex and central facets of the human experience (e.g., language, memory, 
consciousness, etc.) that have benefitted a great deal from having structured 
frameworks and classifications which are a great aid in helping us getting our heads 
around the phenomenon in question. They are vital in being able to build and test 
hypotheses, and are hence necessary for progress to be made in the field. And 
indeed, often the findings show how the early ideas and frameworks fell short, and 
modifications or elaborations are made as a result (e.g., the Atkinson-Shiffrin 
memory model, Piaget’s stages of cognitive development, etc.). It is therefore 
enormously useful to have proper terminology, a common understanding of the 
usage of that terminology and related concepts, and a structured framework to help 
comprehend the complexity. At present, there are several disparate ideas afloat on 
different aspects of imagination with very little crosstalk between the domains. The 
aim of this paper is to outline a theoretically and empirically informed novel 
framework that will help integrate these different strands in a meaningful manner with 
the hope that it will help promote seamless information flow, constructive discourse 
and progress in the field. 
 
Carving imagination at the joints: Hints from philosophy  
Although the imagination has not figured prominently on the radar of psychologists 
and neuroscientists, the same cannot be said of other academic traditions. 
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Philosophers have grappled with trying to understand and define the imagination for 
centuries, and there is a general consensus that the phenomenon is too broad to 
allow for a comprehensive definition or an exhaustive classification of its different 
facets (Gendler, 2013). A nominal description of imagination from dictionaries of the 
English language is that it reflects the representation of conceptual content in the 
absence of external input. While this explanation may resonate with our folk notions 
of imagination, it is still quite unspecific. For instance, conceptual information in the 
form of rules can be actively maintained in working memory without being presently 
perceived through the senses.  
 
Within the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the definition given is that “to 
imagine something is to form a particular sort of mental representation of that thing” 
where imagining is seen as distinct from mental states such as perceiving, 
remembering, believing, desiring, anticipating, conceiving and supposing (Gendler, 
2013). From the psychological and neuroscientific domains though, such distinctions 
do not appear to be tenable because, as will be explored in more detail subsequent 
sections, there is abundant evidence showing that remembering and conceiving are 
acts of imagination in that they impinge on specific declarative memory operations 
that involve construction or simulation (Buckner, 2010; Mullally and Maguire, 2013; 
Schacter et al., 2012).  
 
In an attempt to provide an all-inclusive yet pithy definition, Nigel J. T. Thomas stated 
that, “Imagination is what makes our sensory experience meaningful, enabling us to 
interpret and make sense of it, whether from a conventional perspective or from a 
fresh, original, individual one. It is what makes perception more than the mere 
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physical stimulation of sense organs. It also produces mental imagery, visual and 
otherwise, which is what makes it possible for us to think outside the confines of our 
present perceptual reality, to consider memories of the past and possibilities for the 
future, and to weigh alternatives against one another. Thus, imagination makes 
possible all our thinking about what is, what has been, and, perhaps most important, 
what might be” (as cited in Manu, 2006). This definition also has the problem of 
being very wide. However, its detail and comprehensiveness renders it to have utility 
in terms of serving as an anchor in the development of a theoretical framework from 
which to understand imagination from psychological and neuroscientific perspectives 
as it taps many different realms of imagination (Abraham and Bubic, 2015). The 
usefulness of this definition also lies in the fact that it highlights one of the central 
features of imagination – that this faculty allows us to contemplate matters beyond 
the immediate present.  
 
Several taxonomies have been put forward to differentiate between aspects of 
imagination. These include spontaneous versus deliberate imagining, solitary versus 
social imagining, and sensory versus recreative versus creative imagining (Currie 
and Ravenscroft, 2002; Walton, 1990). Each of these groupings emphasize specific 
distinguishing factors – the level of volition entailed in the directedness of the 
process, the involvement of a collective, and the perceptual or recollective or novel 
combinatorial nature of the process, respectively. Such dual and triple classifications, 
although non-exhaustive, also effectively aid in the structuring and categorization of 
the complex mass of neuroscientific literature on imagination.  
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To date, the most comprehensive classification of imagination was undertaken by 
Leslie Stevenson who outlined 12 types or conceptions (Stevenson, 2003). These 
include fundamental faculties, such as the ability to form mental images or conceive 
of anything at all, as well as thinking of something that is spatio-temporally possible 
or real but not currently perceived. The ability to form beliefs, make non-rational 
causal inferences, and conceive of some things as fictional while others are real is 
distinguished from the liability to believe something unreal to be real. Finally, the 
sensuous experience when appreciating works of art, beauty and expressions that 
reveal the true meaning of life, and the creation of such works to evoke such 
sensuous phenomenology are also given their due in this conceptualization. These 
conceptions are of a descriptive nature and their distinctions are not directly 
indicative of operationalized mechanisms. But, just as with the aforementioned 
categorizations, these more detailed characterizations which I informally allocated 
above into three general groupings of sensory-based, intentionality-based and 
phenomenology-based distinctions, are also valuable as they allow us to determine 
the comprehensiveness of any information processing framework that is applied to 
understand the imagination.  
 
As a final point in this section, it is worth noting that contemporary philosophical 
discourse on the imagination mainly centers around three domains (Gendler, 2013): 
(a) the phenomenology and cognitive architecture of imagination, (b) aesthetics and 
imaginative engagement in fiction, and (c) how the ability to imagine and conceive 
shape possibility from the perspective of modal epistemology. Of these, the bulk of 
the investigations on the neuroscience of imagination can be said to address issues 
which are of relevance to the first domain (A) – correspondences between 
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imagination and other mental states, understanding of self and others, 
representations of past and future events, and so on. Quite distinct from these is the 
focus on brain mechanisms underlying aesthetic engagement (B) or of hypothetical 
forms of reasoning (C), which have received substantially less focus within the 
neuroscience of imagination. This nexus between the philosophical and 
neuroscientific domains serves as a starting point for developing a common 
framework. I expand on these theoretical-empirical parallels within the framework by 
also incorporating the aforementioned distinctions of how phenomenon relevant to 
the human imagination are construed (and investigated). This novel information 
processing framework of imagination will be outlined in the following section.  
 
Carving imagination at the joints: Hints from cognitive neuroscience  
One commonality that is noticeable in the empirical literature on the diverse fields of 
imagination is that the classifications employed to indicate information processing 
distinctions when characterizing different processes of imagination are essentially 
the same as those used when describing non-imaginative aspects of psychological 
function: top-down versus bottom-up, implicit versus explicit, intrinsic versus 
extrinsic, spontaneous versus deliberate, automatic versus controlled, global versus 
local. Nonetheless, although neuroscientific research is actively carried out in many 
different fields of imagination, there is little theoretical or empirical crosstalk between 
the domains. When there is dialogue between fields, it is mainly limited to contexts 
where a high degree of correspondence can be found across domains either in the 
resulting findings (e.g., engagement of similar brain regions) or in the theoretical 
rationale guiding the expectations (e.g., brain regions involved in perception overlap 
with those involved in imagination).  
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To help navigate the major discoveries within neuroscience of imagination, a novel 
framework will be rolled out over the next few sections. The many research domains 
will be allocated to five different categories based loosely on the philosophical ideas 
which were presented in the previous section regarding the classifications or types of 
imagination (Figure 1), and their correspondences in terms of brain function (Figure 
2) which are described in detail below. These categories are labelled: (i) mental 
imagery-based imagination, (ii) intentionality-based imagination, (iii) novel 
combinatorial-based imagination, (iv) phenomenology-based imagination, and (v) 
altered states of imagination. 
 
I. Mental imagery-based imagination (perceptual/motor) 
With regard to the kind of phenomena covered by the term imagination, much of the 
focus in the tradition of philosophy has been on the “quasi-perceptual experience” of 
mental imagery (Thomas, 2014). The founding theorists of modern day empirical 
psychology, such as William James and Gustav Fechner, who were steeped in 
traditions of philosophy, did give serious thought to understanding the difference 
between imagination and perception (James, 1891). Among the many points of 
discourse were individual differences in imagination, types of mental images (visual, 
auditory, touch, motor), and how after-images differ from imagination-images.  
 
In comparison to other aspects of imagination, the domain of mental imagery has 
received abundant attention in the post-behaviorist era within psychology and 
neuroscience. Critical debates that have dominated this field, such as those 
concerning the format of mental representations (Pearson and Kosslyn, 2015; 
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Pylyshyn, 2002), fuel much of the research impetus. One of the crucial issues has 
been to identify whether the brain regions that are involved in sensory perception or 
motion generation are also involved in the mental imagery of these states. Indeed 
considerable evidence lends support to this idea (Pearson, Naselaris, Holmes, and 
Kosslyn, 2015). For instance, perceiving or imagining single letters resulted in brain 
activity within early and late visual processing areas in the occipital and temporal 
lobes, indicating their involvement in both visual perception and visual imagery 
(Stokes, Thompson, Cusack, and Duncan, 2009). Even among individuals who are 
fully blind from birth, mental imagery has been shown to activate the primary and 
secondary visual cortices (Lambert, Sampaio, Mauss, and Scheiber, 2004; Striem-
Amit, Cohen, Dehaene, and Amedi, 2012).  
 
Complementary findings of the overlap between perception and imagery have been 
also reported in the auditory domain for simple auditory features, music, language, 
and complex nonverbal sounds (Hubbard, 2010), as well as in the motor domain in 
the form of mental simulations of actions (Hétu et al., 2013). For instance, both 
hearing or imagining complex nonverbal sounds led to activations in the secondary 
auditory cortex (Bunzeck, Wuestenberg, Lutz, Heinze, and Jancke, 2005). There is 
also evidence for training-specific effects on imagery. Musically trained participants 
outperform musically naïve counterparts on musical and nonmusical tasks of 
auditory imagery, but not visual imagery (Aleman, Nieuwenstein, Böcker, and de 
Haan, 2000). Indeed, in a magnetoencephalography (MEG) study where musicians 
and non-musicians imagined familiar melodies and then indicated whether a 
presented tone correctly continued the melody, incorrect tones led to an imagery 
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mismatch negativity (MMN), which is a brain response indicating violation of an 
established rule, but only in musicians (Herholz, Lappe, Knief, and Pantev, 2009).  
 
Within the motor domain, regions of the superior parietal lobule and premotor cortex 
have been shown to be engaged under conditions of executed reaching, observed 
reaching and imagined reaching (Filimon, Nelson, Hagler, and Sereno, 2007). The 
pattern of motor imagery related brain engagement is also highly specific. For 
instance, the type of activation in relation to different effectors (arm, hand, mouth) 
along the premotor cortex corresponds to the somatotopic organization of the motor 
cortex for movement of those effectors (Wolfensteller, Schubotz, and von Cramon, 
2007). Evidence also indicates that intentional facets of action are coded in the 
posterior parietal cortex as revealed by motor imagery of action goals in people who 
cannot actually move their limbs, such as in tetraplegic paralysis (Aflalo et al., 2015).  
 
Other approaches that are informative in the context of mental imagery include 
investigations on cross-modal facets of perception and imagery in terms of 
multisensory perception (Berger and Ehrsson, 2014) and sensory substitution in 
perception (Poirier, De Volder, and Scheiber, 2007). Indeed, one attempt to 
differentiate modality-specific from modality-independent aspects of the imagery 
brain systems revealed that visual and auditory association cortices are engaged 
during mental imagery in a modality-specific fashion whereas the modality-
independent “core” imagery network corresponds to the Default Mode Network 
(DMN) (Daselaar, Porat, Huijbers, and Pennartz, 2010). The DMN is comprised of 
brain areas that are strongly engaged under conditions of rest and spontaneous 
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cognition (Andrews-Hanna, 2012), and the significance of its role in imagination will 
be explored in more detail within the next section.  
 
So the behavioral and neuroscientific evidence across sensory-motor domains 
supports the notion of a functional overlap between the neural substrates involved in 
perception/action and imagery of the same (Figure 2). The literature also illustrates 
the inherent flexibility and plasticity within brain systems with regard to mental 
imagery as the engagement of brain regions is differentially modulated as a function 
of training (e.g., musicians) and mode of environmental sampling (e.g., congenital 
blindness).  
 
II. Intentionality-based imagination (recollective/social) 
The neuroscientific approach to understanding psychological function faces 
abundant criticism from all quarters, with some questioning the very usefulness of 
this approach in delivering concrete answers about perception, cognition, emotion or 
action. For instance, one major criticism is the inability of neuroimaging studies to 
deliver unanimous verdicts on competing theories that offer the best explanation for 
some facet of psychological function (Coltheart, 2006, 2013). There is some push 
back that engages with such issues (Poldrack, 2006), but what is rarely reflected 
upon or given its due is how neuroimaging often allows us to discover commonalities 
in the underlying information processing mechanisms of aspects of psychological 
function that are not usually considered in relation to one another (Mather, Cacioppo, 
and Kanwisher, 2013).  
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An outstanding example of this is in the case of processes of imagination such as 
autobiographical and episodic memory (e.g., reminiscing about my first day of 
primary school), episodic future thinking (e.g., imagining what my next birthday will 
be like), mental state reasoning or theory of mind (e.g., making inferences about 
what someone else is thinking about), self-referential thinking (e.g., evaluating my 
own thoughts and behavior), and moral reasoning (e.g., gauging the permissibility of 
my own or someone else’s action). What these operations have in common is that all 
of them engage core regions of the default mode network (DMN), which include the 
medial prefrontal cortex (ventral and dorsal aspects), medial parietal cortex 
(retrosplenial and posterior cingulate cortices), anterior lateral temporal cortex, 
inferior parietal cortex (including the temporoparietal junction), and medial temporal 
lobe structures like the hippocampal formation (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, and 
Spreng, 2014; Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, and Schacter, 2008; Mullally and Maguire, 
2013; Schacter et al., 2012; Spreng, Mar, and Kim, 2009).  
 
The role of the DMN has been widely documented in association with literature that 
shows its consistent engagement during stimulus-independent or spontaneous 
cognition, which automatically occurs under conditions of rest or low cognitive 
demand. Participants in fact report active internal mentation within such situations 
which take the form of thinking about their past, their future, and so on (Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010). So there is evidence of considerable overlap in the brain 
networks involved in diverse aspects of imagination, such as contemplating events 
that could unfold in one’s future or evaluating another person’s behavior in a specific 
situation, regardless of whether these emerge as a result of spontaneous cognition 
or directed cognition.  
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In the early days of uncovering the functional profile associated with the DMN, 
another dominant idea about the role of the DMN was that it was engaged during 
“stimulus-oriented thought” where the brain is primed towards the potential for 
encountering task relevant information (Gilbert, Dumontheil, Simons, Frith, and 
Burgess, 2007). No published study has directly tested for these competing 
alternatives within a single experiment, and other hypotheses have been proposed in 
the interim, such as, for instance, that the DMN is driven by significant revisions of 
cognitive context, regardless of whether it the context is externally or internally 
focused (Crittenden, Mitchell, and Duncan, 2015).  
 
The bulk of the studies reporting non-task specific mental activities engaging the 
DMN interpret their findings in relation to the stimulus-independent thought 
framework. But the adaptive nature of this internal mentation has also been given its 
due. The literature on prospection or future thinking, for instance, refers to imagining 
and simulating future scenarios and possibilities (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Bubić 
and Abraham, 2014; Buckner, 2010; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). These would 
nonetheless be classified non-task specific or stimulus independent because the 
“task” or rather the “possibility” being prepared for or simulating is either not well-
defined or not directly related to the task at hand. Giambra (1995) held that task 
unrelated mentation was instantiated as directing thought “away from the current 
situation” which are nonetheless reflective of an individual’s current concerns. 
Smallwood and Schooler (2006) in fact stated that “mind wandering can be seen as 
a goal-driven process, albeit one that is not directed toward the primary task.” 
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Several proposals have been put forward to address the functional role and/or 
outline a common metric that can account for the involvement of the DMN (in whole 
or part) in this diverse array of mental operations. These include self-projection 
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007), mental scene construction (Hassabis and Maguire, 
2009), constructive simulation (Schacter, 2012b), proactive associative processing 
(Bar, 2007), and evaluative processing (Legrand and Ruby, 2009). Interestingly, 
some evidence indicates that these may not be mutually exclusive hypotheses, and 
that varying functional roles may be differentially undertaken by distinct components 
of the same circuitry. For instance, Kurczek et al. (2015) reported that compared to 
healthy matched control participants, neurological patients with lesions of the medial 
prefrontal cortex showed impairments in self-referential evaluation but not self-
projection, whereas patients with lesions of the medial temporal lobe showed the 
opposite pattern in that they were impaired in self-projection but not self-referential 
thinking (Kurczek et al., 2015).  
 
When considering the commonalities between these different forms of imagination, it 
appears that the contexts that are evoked in each of these situations are distinctly 
“social” in that they involve having to make appraisals of, reason about or evaluate 
actions and events that involve one or more entities. Although it may therefore seem 
reasonable to refer to this category of imagination as social, it might not be entirely 
accurate to do so. After all, as the landmark Heider and Simmel study as well as 
subsequent investigations on the attribution of causality and apparent behavior 
clearly demonstrate, we ascribe mental states and personality traits to non-entities 
as well (Bloom and Veres, 1999; Heider and Simmel, 1944; Scholl and Tremoulet, 
2000). Such findings should force us to consider the larger question of what is 
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“social” about social information if it cannot be fully defined in terms of entity-hood, 
conspecifics and other biological features, or categories of social groups. For the 
present purpose of developing classifications of the operations of imagination, the 
notion of intentionality in relation to the “intentional stance” (Dennett, 1987) may 
provide a more viable and representative label for this category.  
 
In this seminal work, Dennett (1987) distinguished between three stances that are in 
play (implicitly) in our minds as we evaluate events that come to pass around us. 
The physical stance is the one that is applied when the events in question can be 
explained by the actions of the physical forces in the world (e.g., A pencil that rolls 
off a table will fall down to the floor). This is distinguished from the design stance, 
which is applied when an occurrence can be accounted for in terms of the manner in 
which things are designed for a specific function (e.g., A thermostat automatically 
switches on and off to regulate the temperature in a room). For any happening that 
cannot be explained either in terms of the physical stance or the design stance, the 
intentional stance is automatically applied. Here the events are interpreted in a 
manner that is intentional or goal-directed (e.g., If the reader has reached this point 
in the paper, it must mean that s/he is interested in the ideas presented within. No 
purely physical phenomenon, such as wind, can account for the turning of the pages, 
and the pages were not designed to turn on their own).  
 
So the operations of imagination discussed within this section (mental state 
reasoning, episodic future thinking, etc.) are classified into the intentionality-based 
category of imagination as they trigger processing that is predominantly recollective 
in nature with a view to establishing the best possible explanation of a situation or 
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event in question. This is brought about by means of spontaneous access to an 
extensive and diverse repertoire of relevant knowledge when processing such 
contexts. The best or most plausible explanation is the one that fits best with what is 
already known in terms of oneself and/or one’s world-view. The brain network that is 
most consistently implicated in intentionality-based imagination is the default mode 
network (DMN) (Figure 2). Indeed, a recent article even advocated that the DMN 
actually “primes the intentional stance” (Spunt, Meyer, and Lieberman, 2015).  
 
III. Novel combinatorial-based imagination (counterfactual/creative/generative) 
“A work of art is never complete, merely abandoned,” is a quote that is commonly 
attributed to Leonardo Da Vinci. The essence of what is conveyed in this statement 
hints at elements which are intrinsic to the processes of imagination that fall into this 
third category, such as novelty, open-endedness, discovery and generativity. When 
our powers of imagination are focused beyond the “what was” and “what is” and 
extends to the “what if” or “what might be”, the possibility space that we explore is 
considerably wider, and this is true across the domains of art, science, and 
commerce. What would happen to the world if the earth stopped rotating? How can 
watermelons, parsnips and mustard be combined to make a tasty meal? What new 
strategy could I devise for my team to be able to challenge our stronger competitors? 
These contexts are relatively open-ended in one or more aspects of the problem 
solving/exploration process as they involve journeying within the possibility space to 
go beyond the status quo, and necessitate combining or evaluating existing 
knowledge in novel ways. Such situations therefore call for “novel combinatorial 
thinking” as they necessitate counterfactual reasoning, hypothesis generation, 
creativity or hypothetical reasoning during problem solving/exploration. 
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When presented with a question or a problem to be resolved, the question 
exploration or problem solving process typically involves searching for ideas, 
solutions, strategies or plans. The process therefore requires getting from the 
problem (initial-state) to the solution (goal-state) via a specified course of action 
(operations-state). Everyday problem solving, regardless of whether it involves the 
acquisition of new skills (e.g., learning to ice-skate) or carrying out familiar actions 
(e.g., watering plants in a garden), is marked by well-defined initial-states and goal-
states as well as relatively logical and incremental courses of action in the 
operations-state. In the case of novel-combinatorial aspects of imagination though, 
one or more of these states during problem exploration is unknown or is relatively 
open-ended and involves more degrees of freedom.  
 
Two examples from the domain of creativity can be taken to illustrate the specifics of 
such differences. Both tasks have clearly defined initial-states but they differ greatly 
in terms of their goal-states. When asked to invent as many uses as possible for a 
common object (e.g., newspaper), the problem-solving scenario faced by a 
participant is open-ended in terms of the goal-state as the numerous potential 
uses/responses can be generated (divergent creativity task: Alternate Uses Task). In 
contrast, when asked to find a fourth word which forms a compound associate with 
three given words (e.g., nuclear/feud/album), the goal-state is less open-ended as 
the number of potential solutions/responses is limited (solution: family) (convergent 
creativity task: Remote Associates Test). But both are considered to be tasks that 
assess creative thinking because the possibility space being explored within the 
operations-states is relatively open-ended and necessitates non-linear combinations 
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of information to arrive at the solution by undergoing perspective shifts, changing 
mental sets, or overcoming functional fixedness (Abraham and Windmann, 2007).  
 
A critical point to note at this juncture is that novelty in this context does not merge 
ex nihilo or from nothing. To borrow the words of Stein (1953), who is recognized as 
being the first to have articulated the currently accepted definition of creativity 
(Runco and Jaeger, 2012), it “… arises from a reintegration of already existing 
materials or knowledge, but when it is completed it contains elements that are new” 
(Stein, 1953). This has parallels the idea of novelty as arising from the blending or 
“bisociation” of two or more unrelated thought matrices to engender a new matrix of 
meaning (Koestler, 1969). 
 
Operations that belong to the novel-combinatorial category of imagination include 
creativity in problem solving and expression, divergent thinking, counterfactual 
reasoning, hypothesis generation, and hypothetical reasoning (Abraham and Bubic, 
2015). In stark contrast to the relatively consistent picture that emerges from 
investigations of intentionality-based forms of imagination, the literature on novel 
combinatorial-based imagination is far more heterogeneous and complicated. This is 
because it has received less attention from the empirical realm, and there is virtually 
no discourse between the sub-domains. So it is exceedingly challenging to infer and 
present a comprehensive picture from the disparate findings in the literature. 
Nonetheless, a tentative case will be made for functional commonalities based on 
coherent patterns that emerge across the research areas within this category.  
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In the most general terms, creativity is defined as the capacity to generate responses 
that are both original (novel, unique, statistically rare) and appropriate (fitting, 
relevant, meaningful) to a particular end (Runco and Jaeger, 2012; Stein, 1953). This 
definition of creativity applies to all categories of human endeavor regardless of 
whether it refers to creativity in service of problem solving, such as in scientific and 
applied domains, or creativity in service of expression, as in the fine and performing 
arts. The observed commonality across these spheres is that spontaneous and 
open-ended production of ideas/responses (idea generation), creative or otherwise, 
leads to the engagement of parts of the default mode network (DMN), particularly in 
the medial aspects of the prefrontal and frontopolar cortex. When constraints of 
ensuring relevance or appropriateness are applied to the generated responses (idea 
selection) in order to be deemed truly creative, semantic and cognitive control brain 
networks are activated, particularly lateral aspects of the prefrontal and frontopolar 
cortex (Abraham, 2014; Abraham et al., 2012; Beaty, Benedek, Barry Kaufman, and 
Silvia, 2015; Jung, Mead, Carrasco, and Flores, 2013; Limb and Braun, 2008).  
 
That patterns of brain engagement vary in terms of the degree to which the 
possibility space in the operations-state is constrained can also be gleaned from 
other types of hypothetical thinking that call for novel-combinatorial cognition, such 
as hypothesis generation and imagining fictional scenarios, as well as counterfactual 
and hypothetical reasoning. What seems to be the case is that when the possibility 
space that is being explored is, relatively speaking, more open-ended (or less 
constrained), there is greater activity in medial prefrontal regions and other parts of 
the DMN. And, conversely, that when the possibility space that is being explored is , 
relatively speaking, less open-ended (or more constrained), there is greater activity 
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in lateral prefrontal regions and other parts of the semantic and cognitive control 
brain networks. 
 
For instance, across verbal and non-verbal domains, hypothesis generation (e.g., 
can a word be made out of the letters IKFEN?) commonly engages the ventral lateral 
prefrontal cortex (Goel and Vartanian, 2005; Vartanian and Goel, 2005). Similar 
brain regions are selectively activated when evaluating whether scenarios containing 
fictional characters could occur in our reality as we know it (e.g., Is it possible to 
speak to Cinderella?) compared to those involving real entities (e.g., Is it possible to 
speak to George Bush?) (Abraham, von Cramon, and Schubotz, 2008). The 
possibility space in such contexts is more constrained (or less open-ended) as the 
degrees of freedom in what is being explored is narrowly limited to a few tangible 
options. Moreover, the goal-states here involve reaching solutions or responses that 
can be deemed to be objectively correct.  
 
In contrast, situations that call for counterfactual or hypothetical reasoning, which 
necessitate relatively wider and more open-ended sampling and integration of 
information in the possibility space, consistently engage DMN regions such as the 
medial prefrontal cortex (Abraham, Schubotz, and von Cramon, 2008; Van Hoeck et 
al., 2013) and the hippocampus (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, and Maguire, 2007). 
The mental operations targeted here include episodic counterfactual thinking (e.g., If 
I had left the office earlier, I wouldn't have missed my train), semantic future thinking 
(e.g., Is it likely that Sydney will have a Disneyland in 50 years?), and imagining new 
visuospatial scenes. The goal-states involve reaching solutions or responses that 
can only be deemed to be subjectively true or likely. 
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As the DMN is engaged in both novel combinatorial-based and intentionality-based 
imagination, its role needs further clarification. Both types of imagination entail the 
involuntary or spontaneous access to extensive and heterogeneous sources of 
knowledge with the goal of generating explanations/ideas/hypotheses in relation to a 
situation or event. The more open the possibility space or the wider the net that is 
cast to sample information needed to reach these explanations/ideas/hypotheses, 
the stronger the engagement of the DMN. The difference between the two appears 
to lie at the level of explanation/outcome. In keeping with the essentially receptive-
predictive cycle of human brain function (Bubic, von Cramon, and Schubotz, 2010), 
the best possible explanation in intentionality-based forms of imagination is one that 
fits best or offers the path of least resistance. The opposite is true in the case of 
novel-combinatorial based imagination where the situation calls for either overriding 
the prepotent response or taking account of previously unconsidered perspectives – 
and this necessitates the added recruitment of non-DMN networks. 
 
So a complex interplay between the default mode, semantic cognition and cognitive 
control networks novel orchestrate novel combinatorial-based facets of imagination 
(Figure 2), and one of the metrics to consider when characterizing this system 
appears to be the degree of constraints/open-endedness within different aspects of 
the problem solving/exploration process. This is a tentative hypothesis, but it is one 
that can be readily and systematically investigated. 
 
IV. Phenomenology-based imagination (aesthetic engagement) 
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In stating that “the principle of true art is not to portray but to evoke,” the novelist 
Jerzy Kosinsky points to an essential feature that is common to all art forms – that a 
work of art is designed to elicit a specific response or set of responses. But what is 
curious about the elicited aesthetic response upon appreciating a work of art is that it 
is not a uni-dimensional reaction that one experiences. Instead, we undergo states of 
complex sensuous phenomenology that are subjective and cannot be fully explained 
by the sensory features of the object alone.  
 
The focus within the psychology and neuroscience of aesthetics has largely been on 
the aesthetics of art, particularly visual art and music, although it is clear that 
aesthetic experiences also occur in non-artifact based contexts (Palmer, Schloss, 
and Sammartino, 2013). There are several ideas concerning the fundamentals of the 
aesthetic response, in terms of aesthetic experience, which is held to reflect an 
exceptional state of mind, as well as aesthetic preference, which is a judgment of 
beauty. These are regarded as relatively distinct components as art expertise 
significantly influences this latter more cognitive component of aesthetic 
appreciation, but not the affective experience of the same (van Paasschen, Bacci, 
and Melcher, 2015). Within aesthetic experience itself, Marković (2011) distinguishes 
between three components: (a) aesthetic fascination as evidenced by high levels of 
arousal, absorption in attentional focus and a sense of loss of time, (b) aesthetic 
appraisal or cognitive engagement which allows one to transcend generic uses of 
meaning, and (c) aesthetic emotions which give rise to feelings of unity and 
connectedness with the object of aesthetic fascination and appraisal (Marković, 
2012). Aesthetic emotions are distinguished from non-aesthetic or everyday 
emotions in that they are elicited when experiencing the aesthetic object, but do not 
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serve utilitarian or homeostatic ends despite being associated with non-action-
oriented bodily responses, such as pilorection and tears (Scherer, 2005).  
 
Of the many theories that have been put forward to explain the aesthetic response, 
some aim to account for specific components of the response (e.g., mere exposure 
effect, arousal dynamics, prototype theory and fluency theory), while others chalk out 
stages of information processing that underlie aesthetic appreciation more 
comprehensively (e.g., Shimamura’s I-SKE theory, Silvia’s appraisal theory, 
Parson’s cognitive developmental account and Ognjenović’s three stage theory) 
(Marković, 2012; Palmer et al., 2013). For instance, the most influential theories that 
have been formulated to explain the neuroaesthetics of visual art and music are both 
multi-stage models where aesthetic experience is held to be orchestrated by a 
distributed set of neural networks devoted to different aspects of perceptual, 
cognitive and emotional information processing (Chatterjee and Vartanian, 2014; 
Leder and Nadal, 2014).  
 
Two meta-analyses have been carried out so far on the findings of functional 
neuroimaging studies that have investigated the brain correlates of the aesthetic 
response. The only brain structure that was commonly engaged in aesthetic 
appreciation – even across sensory modalities – was the anterior insula (Brown, 
Gao, Tisdelle, Eickhoff, and Liotti, 2011; Vartanian and Skov, 2014), a region which 
plays a key role in interoceptive awareness and in the processing of emotions 
(Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, and Gross, 2007; Wiens, 2005; Zaki, Davis, and 
Ochsner, 2012). In fact, a recent study of the brain response during dynamic 
emotional experiences when hearing an audio narrative revealed the anterior insula 
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to be the neural hub where interoceptive states of awareness are integrated with 
exteroceptive representations of emotional salience (Nguyen, Breakspear, Hu, and 
Guo, 2016).  
 
This association between aesthetic experience and interoceptive awareness is often 
extended within the literature on neuroaesthetics to interpret the findings as 
reflecting reward processing in the brain, particularly when there is accompanying 
brain activity within the basal ganglia. This is because features such as symmetry, 
harmony, fluency and good gestalt are conventionally associated with beauty and 
positive affect in aesthetic appreciation. There is much evidence that points to a 
general human preference for symmetrical or prototypical stimuli which has been 
ascribed to the fact that such forms are easier (or less cognitive demanding) to 
process than their counterparts (fluency: Reber, Schwarz, and Winkielman, 2004). 
Lower information processing costs also explain why stimuli that have been 
repeatedly seen before are evaluated as more pleasant (mere exposure effect: 
Zajonc, 1968).   
 
Equating aesthetic appreciation solely with the experience of pleasure or “positive 
emotions” is, however, not without its problems. For one thing, there appears to be a 
general conflation of the concept of positive emotion with that of reward or positive 
reinforcement. It is also undeniable that aesthetic appraisal not only elicits positive 
emotions (e.g., pleasure) but also negative and other complex emotions (e.g., anger, 
confusion, regret, shame, and so on) (Silvia, 2009). Moreover, there are innumerable 
examples of high art that one can readily call to mind where convention is thrown to 
the wind and characteristics like symmetry and fluency are purposefully obliterated to 
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create a perceptual challenge. Such works are nonetheless also experienced to be 
deeply aesthetically satisfying. Indeed, the importance of negative affect in the 
aesthetic response is unmistakable as artists often design their works to violate 
predictions that have been built up.  
 
The prediction error account of aesthetic appreciation does a handy job of 
accommodating seemingly counterintuitive processes that are play during aesthetic 
appreciation (Van de Cruys and Wagemans, 2011). The central idea is that great 
works of art are designed such that expectations are generated and then destroyed 
at optimal points. The recipient of such works experiences ambiguity at first, but this 
feeling dissipates as meaning is derived by constructing a novel pattern, which 
comes about by forging new associations between the few conceptual hooks that 
have been provided. This process involves generating new meaning on a different 
level, and the success at piecing together this novel gestalt leads to a reduction in 
ambiguity and uncertainty, alongside a corresponding reward effect from having 
“solved the puzzle”. This has also been referred to as the “aesthetic aha” (Muth and 
Carbon, 2013). Indeed, that aesthetic experiences are self-rewarding as opposed to 
goal-directed is considered to be one of its defining features (Apter, 1984). Some 
neuropharmacological evidence to support this idea comes from a PET study of 
music listening where the nucleus accumbens, a brain structure which is central to 
the reward system, was strongly engaged during the experience of peak emotional 
responses to music accompanied by endogenous dopamine release in the striatum, 
which also occurred during peak emotional arousal (Salimpoor, Benovoy, Larcher, 
Dagher, and Zatorre, 2011). 
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So the general conclusion from literature on aesthetic appreciation is that the brain 
regions corresponding to the information processing neural circuits that underlie 
interoception, emotion and reward processing are involved in facilitating 
phenomenological aspects of aesthetic engagement (Figure 2). And that the feeling 
of “reward” or positive reinforcement that accompanies aesthetic appreciation can 
occur through two different routes; (a) via resonance through ease of access, and (b) 
via success at the discovery of a novel perspective, association or insight. As a 
caveat, it is worth keeping in mind that the field of neuroaesthetics has largely 
focused on the neural response that accompanies the evaluation of classical 
aesthetic categories, i.e., judgments of aesthetic works as being beautiful, sublime or 
pleasant. As other universal aesthetic categories (e.g., “interesting” - Ngai, 2012) 
have not received much focus, a question that is yet to be explored is how current 
neurocognitive models of the aesthetic response apply in the context of alternative 
categories.  
 
V. Altered states of imagination  
This final category of imagination covers a range of heterogeneous states – some of 
which are functional or standard in that everyone must experience such states 
(dreaming) or can attempt to experience such states (hypnosis, meditation, use of 
psychedelic drugs), while others are decidedly dysfunctional or exceptional in that 
only a subset of the population undergo such experiences (e.g., hallucinations, 
delusions, confabulation, out-of-body experiences). Inferring consistent patterns from 
the diverse literature on these topics is tricky because such states are more 
challenging to investigate and are less well studied. Nonetheless, as these refer to 
altered states of imagination, it will be possible to draw on insights from the 
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previously outlined domains of imagination to provide a useful context from which to 
better understand the information processing mechanisms underlying such states.  
 
Dreaming, which is associated with stages of REM (rapid eye movement) sleep, is a 
state of imagination that each of us experiences regularly. Neuroimaging and EEG 
studies in this domain can be divided into those studying the brain correlates of 
dreaming relative to those investigating dream recall. Findings from the former in situ 
approach as well as the latter retrospective approach indicate that parts of the 
brain’s default mode network (DMN), such as the medial prefrontal, temporo-parietal 
and hippocampal regions, which are involved in intentionality-based imagination, are 
more strongly associated with dreaming while cognitive control regions, such as the 
lateral prefrontal cortex, are deactivated (De Gennaro, Marzano, Cipolli, and Ferrara, 
2012; Fox, Nijeboer, Solomonova, Domhoff, and Christoff, 2013; Hobson, Pace-
Schott, Stickgold, and Kahn, 1998; Maquet, 2000; Maquet et al., 1996; Nir and 
Tononi, 2010).  
 
In contrast, the opposite pattern of brain engagement occurs under conditions of 
hypnosis as these are accompanied by heightened activity in lateral prefrontal 
cognitive control regions alongside the deactivation of DMN regions (Deeley et al., 
2012; Oakley and Halligan, 2009; Vuilleumier, 2014). This dissociation between the 
neural correlates of dreaming and hypnosis is reflective of the fact that the former 
state is spontaneous and involuntarily elicited, whereas the latter state is deliberate 
and directed in nature. Meditative states, on the other hand, involve the interplay 
between spontaneous and deliberate components as both operations are integral to 
the process of meditation, and are differentially called upon depending on the type of 
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meditative technique being applied (Brewer et al., 2011; Hasenkamp, Wilson-
Mendenhall, Duncan, and Barsalou, 2012; Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, and Davidson, 
2008; Manna et al., 2010; Tang, Hölzel, and Posner, 2015).  
 
The intake of psychedelics, such as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), psilocybin and 
ketamine, also give rise to temporary altered states of imagination and result in 
reduced connectivity between regions of the DMN, such as the medial prefrontal 
cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex. While the DMN is normally inversely 
coupled with “task positive” networks such as the executive or cognitive control 
network, the consumption of hallucinogens reverses this pattern such that there is 
heightened connectivity between the DMN and other task-positive networks. Brain 
networks that orchestrate dissimilar functions become undifferentiated under such 
conditions leading to disorganized brain states and unconstrained cognition (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2014; Gallimore, 2015; Tagliazucchi, Carhart-Harris, Leech, Nutt, and 
Chialvo, 2014; Vollenweider and Kometer, 2010).  
 
Some have proposed that the psychedelic model of temporary brain disorganization 
can be taken as a model for systemic brain disorganization as seen in the case of 
psychosis which is often associated with phenomenon such as hallucinations and 
delusions (Carhart-Harris et al., 2013; Corlett, Honey, and Fletcher, 2007). 
Hallucinations refer to the experience of perception in the absence of stimuli. They 
predominantly occur in the auditory and visual domains and are associated with 
corresponding sensory modality specific brain activity (Allen, Larøi, McGuire, and 
Aleman, 2008; Weiss and Heckers, 1999). The brain basis of this phenomenon is 
held to result from reduced activity in brain networks that regulate top-down control 
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via cognitive monitoring and attentional inhibition (Ford et al., 2012; Hugdahl, 2015; 
Shine, O’Callaghan, Halliday, and Lewis, 2014; Waters et al., 2014). The issues of 
personal relevance and social significance have also been highlighted in association 
with hallucinations in psychosis, especially given the contributions of DMN brain 
regions (Bell, 2013; Waters et al., 2014). One among these is the temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ). Lesions to this brain region leads to out-of-body experiences where 
the body is falsely perceived as being visuo-spatially removed from its habitual 
location (Blanke and Arzy, 2005). Indeed, focal stimulation of the TPJ can induce the 
experience of an illusory person who closely shadows the posture of the one being 
stimulated (Arzy, Seeck, Ortigue, Spinelli, and Blanke, 2006).  
 
Another relevant DMN region is the ventral aspects of the medial prefrontal cortex 
and adjoining areas of the orbitofrontal cortex. Lesions to this region are associated 
with the phenomenon of confabulation or false memories, particularly of the 
spontaneous variety, which emerge unprovoked and the elaborations of which can 
reach fantastical proportions (Gilboa et al., 2006; Glowinski, Payman, and 
Frencham, 2008; Schnider, 2003). Although its bears several similarities to the 
phenomenon of delusions, confabulations reflect “pseudo-reminisces” whereas 
delusions are false beliefs that are held with conviction and associated with a high 
degree of fixation and preoccupation (Gilboa, 2010; Kopelman, 2010).  
 
There is enormous heterogeneity associated with the presentation of delusions, 
which are dubbed polythematic when they occur across a range of unrelated topics, 
and monothematic when they revolve around a common theme (Coltheart, Langdon, 
and McKay, 2011). Recent proposals about the brain basis of delusions have 
The	Imaginative	Mind	
34	
	
postulated that they are the result of severe disruptions to the receptive-predictive 
cycle of the brain that are facilitated through frontostriatal loops. This manifests as “a 
failure to optimise uncertainty about sensory information” and leads to lower 
precision in prediction coding and prediction errors (Corlett, Taylor, Wang, Fletcher, 
and Krystal, 2010; Picard and Friston, 2014). Although there are some concerns 
about the extent to which this predictive error theory can comprehensively explain 
the exceedingly complex phenomenon of delusions (Griffiths, Langdon, Le Pelley, 
and Coltheart, 2014; Sass and Byrom, 2015), it is a compelling framework that 
accounts for how such vivid distortions of belief inference are formed and 
maintained.  
 
In summary, this last category of altered states of imagination is reflective of one of 
the 12 conceptualizations by Stevenson (2003), which was described as “the liability 
to think of something that the subject believes to be real, but which is not real”. In 
doing so, they essentially reflect deficient or erroneous “reality testing” (Gerrans, 
2014) that comes about through local or global disruptions within the DMN, cognitive 
control and sensory-motor brain networks.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
When outlining the categories of imagination in the previous sections, the operative 
word that I did not use before but do so now is “predominant”. These categories are 
not to be seen as mutually exclusive. Indeed it would be expected that most contexts 
of imagination would involve a dynamic interplay between processes belonging to 
the different categories. Both intentionality-based and novel combinatorial-based 
processes of imagination are necessarily re-constructive in nature, but intentionality-
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based or recollective processes of imagination will be more strongly drawn upon 
when the context involves piecing together information from existing knowledge in 
order to find the best explanation, expression or solution. In contrast, novel 
combinatorial processes of imagination will be more actively recruited when the 
context involves moving beyond existing knowledge to find new explanations, 
expressions or solutions. By the same token, mental imagery will be expected to 
accompany all other aspects of imagination to a lesser or greater degree depending 
on the demands on the context.  
 
An overview of the current level of knowledge on the neuroscience of the human 
imagination has been provided in this paper. It should be readily apparent that while 
some aspects of imagination are relatively well studied (e.g., imagery), others are 
less so (e.g., altered states). It is therefore to be expected that the investigation of 
less explored fields will reveal several other factors as well as relations between 
factors that must be taken into account in order to suitably characterize the complex 
nature of human imagination and its accompanying brain correlates.  
 
This paper represents a first attempt at synthesizing what is known thus far about the 
myriad facets of human imagination across a variety of perspectives. It can be 
characterized as a product of marrying together the gist of dominant philosophical 
ideas on the imagination with paths of investigation and functional correspondences 
within neuroscience. In doing so, a theoretical framework using a five-part or 
quinquepartite classification has been outlined which should serve to systematize, 
and thereby abet, our understanding of the workings of the human imagination from 
a neurocognitive standpoint (Figures 1 and 2). Within this framework, processes 
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relevant to the human imagination can be allocated to the categories of mental 
imagery-based imagination, intentionality-based imagination, novel combinatorial-
based imagination, phenomenology-based imagination, and altered states of 
imagination.  
 
This preliminary framework can be used to evaluate and integrate new 
developments and corresponding insights that stem from future investigations in this 
field as well as serve as a guide in inferring the fundamental principles by which the 
human imagination emerges in all its complexity. Without active discourse and 
dedicated empirical work involving an extensive cross-disciplinary cohort of 
theoreticians and researchers, progress on understanding these rich and 
quintessential aspects of our daily mental life can only continue at the pace of a slow 
trickle. Scholarship on the human imagination has been delegated to waiting in the 
wings for far too long. It is time to bring it center stage. 
 
 
 
Figure Legends 
Figure 1. A schematic diagram of the five-part or quinquepartite classification of 
operations relevant to the human imagination that have been categorized on the 
basis of similarities in their underlying putative neurocognitive mechanisms.  
 
Figure 2. A generalized summary of the neurocognitive basis of each of the five 
categories of imagination.  
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